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Tau& Id -id, Naval Postgraduate School 
January1 990 
he recent interest in how schedule 
compression and stretchaut affect T the management and cost of soft- 
waredevelopment projects is more than 
academic. As the costs of storing, manipu- 
lating, and transmitting information keep 
falling, computing is being applied as an 
economical solution to many more prob 
lems. 
In more and more companies, informa 
tion technology now affects the entire 
process of creating products. In some 
cases it is even reshaping the product it- 
self. Global competition and deregulation 
are changing the structure of the econ- 
omy, placing a premium on shorter and 
shorter productdevelopment cycles. 
As a result, developing software at accel- 
erated schedules is becoming increasingly 
important As John Boddie has written, 
“crunch mode is not a matter of opportu- 
nity - it’s a matter of survival.. . . The abil- 
ity to get working software quickly into the 
hands of users will be characteristic of 
successful data-processing organizations 
for the foreseeable future. Groups that 
can produce and install software systems 
within tight time frames will prosper. 
Those [that] can’t will fail and, in some 
cases, they will bring the enterprises of 
which they area partdownwith them. Fast 
response to changing information-pre 
cessing requirements is a necessity in 
today’s world.”’ 
Software managers can compress 
schedules by increasing their staff, work- 
ing their staff longer hours, acquiring 
software-based automation aids (and 
training their staff to use them), and buy- 
ing hardware for faster coding and tes  
ting. But compressing a project’s sched- 
ule is not without risk, chief of which is 
software that doesn’t meet the users’ func- 
tional or  budgetary requirements. As 
Frederick P. Brooks noted, “more soft- 
ware projects have gone awry for lack of 
calendar time than for all other causes 
combined.”* 
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What is the effect of schedule compres 
sion or stretch-ut on total project cost? 
What are the tradeaffs? These things are 
not easy to measure, and research into 
these questions has been hampered by 
two difficulties. First, controlled experi- 
ments are too expensive and time-con- 
suming. Second, it is difficult to identify 
projects whose schedules have been com- 
pressed and to measure that compression. 
I conducted my work on schedule com- 
pression within a much broader effort to 
study and predict the dpamics of the en- 
tire development process. Much of this 
project involved developing a compre- 
hensive systemdynamics model, which is 
summarized in the box on p. 102-103. 
Current models 
Schedule compression (or stretchqut) 
can be defined in terms of the percentage 
of schedule cut  (or extension) in a 
project’s planned duration with respect to 
a nomindschedule for the project3 
Recent years have seen the develop 
ment of models based on the theory that a 
project’s cost is sensitive to variations in its 
development time. These models include 
the Air Force’s, RCA’s Price S, Barry 
Boehm’s Cocomo, and Lawrence Put- 
nam’s Software Lifecycle Model. 
All of them predict an increase in cost 
when the schedule is compressed below 
some nominal value. However, as Figure 1 
shows, they vary widely in estimating how 
steep the cost penalty. The models also 
disagree on the effect of schedule stretch- 
out on cost: The Air Force, Cocomo, and 
RCA models show a cost increase; Put- 
nam’s a decrease. 
Such significant differences cause con- 
fusion and distrust among software man- 
agers: Which models, if any, apply to their 
environment? A study that tried to apply 
these models in a commercial informa- 
tion-systems environment substantiated 
these concerns: In a study of 47 projects, 
D.R Jeffery could find no support for the 
relationship between elapsed time and ef- 
fort by any of these models: 
Researchers who study schedule com- 
pression and its effect on project behavior 
face two challenges. First, they must iden- 
tlfy projects that are compressed and mea- 
sure the compression. For example, if, as 
Jeffrey has written, “two projects of equal 
size are completed in, say, six months and 
eight months elapsed time, respectively, 
then one possibility is that the six-month 
project has been under time pressure and 
has been compressed. A second possibil- 
ity, however, is that the eight-month proj- 
ect has been allowed to extend beyond 
normal completion data because of, say, 
other staff commitments. The difficulty in 
research is in recognizing projects [that 
did in fact] have compression pressure a p  
plied.“ 
Second, researchers must find a sub  
stitute for controlled experimentation to 
test their hypotheses. Controlled experi- 
ments are not only too costly and time- 
consuming, but it is also very difficult to 
isolate and evaluate the effects of any one 
variable in a large, complex, and dynamic 
project. We must find other ways to test 
our hypotheses. 
I believe simulation modeling is an a p  
propriate tool for this task. Simulation 
models are not only cheaper and less 
time-consuming, but they let you control 
the experimentation perfectly. 
ExperimeNts 
I used my systemdynamics model, de- 
scribed in the box on pp. 102-103, to con- 
duct three simulation experiments: 
In the first, I investigated the effects of 
different levels of schedule compression 
and stretchaut on total project cost in 
mandays and compared the results to 
those reported in the literature. 
In the second, I addressed the stealthy 
role undersizing plays in schedule com- 
pression. Undersizing a project inadver- 
tently leads to schedule underestimation, 
which is one form of schedule compres 
sion, albeit an involuntary one. Thus, the 
cost of a compressed and undersized proj- 
ect reflects the combined influences of 
known schedule compression as well as 
the involuntary compression resulting 
from undersizing. In the second experi- 
ment, I tried to untangle these two forms 
of schedule compression and isolate their 
separate effects on project cost. 
9 A project’s completion time depends 
not only on how much its schedule iscom- 
pressed or stretched but also on manage- 
ment’s commitment (or lack of it) to that 
schedule. In the third experiment, I inves- 
tigated how different levels of managerial 
commitment affect the project’s final cost 
and completion time. 
Subject. My subject for the three experi- 
ments was a real project at the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
To help validate my model, I conducted a 
case study to test its accuracy in duplicat- 
ing the dynamic behavior of the Dynamic 
Explorer satellite project. 
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The DE-A project, conducted by the sys- 
temsdevelopment section of the God- 
dard Space Flight Center at Greenbelt, 
Md., was to design, implement, and test a 
software system for processing telemetry 
data and providing attitude determina- 
tion and control for the DE-A satellite. 
The Fortran system runs on IBM System 
360/95 and System 360175 mainframes. 
At the start of the project, the estimates 
for system size, total development effort, 
and schedule were 16,000 source instruc- 
tions, 1,100 mandays, and 320 working 
days, respectively. On completion, the DE- 
A project had delivered 24,400 source in- 
structions in 2,200 man-days and  380 
working days. 
Figure 2 shows my model’s simulation of 
the DE-A software project. My model ac- 
curately replicated the project’s actual be- 
havior. The figure illustrates that DE-AS 
management held to the project’s esti- 
mated schedule in days during most ofthe 
project’s design and coding phases, de- 
spite a gradual increase in the perceived 
project size, measured in thousands of de- 
livered source instructions. To maintain 
the schedule, management added to the 
project’s work force. 
This approach is not atypical. It arises, 
according to Tom DeMarco, from politi- 
cal considerations: “Once an original esti- 
mate is made, it’s all too tempting to pass 
up subsequent opportunities to estimate 
bysimplystickingwith your previous num- 
bers. This often happens even when you 
know your old estimates are substantially 
off. There are a few explanations for this 
reestimate now, I risk having to do it again 
later (and looking bad twice) ... As you 
can see, all such reasons are p~litical.”~ 
However, the DE-A project’s work-force 
pattern does not conform to the staffing 
pattern typically portrayed in the litera- 
ture, where the work-force level rises, 
peaks, and then drops back to lower levels 
as the project nears the testing phase. In- 
stead, the work-force level rises steadily, 
because NASA tied the launch of the satel- 
lite to the completion of the software. All 
software had to be accepted and frozen 90 
days before launch, and no serious sched- 
ule slippages were tolerated. 
Therefore, as the project approached 
this maximum tolerable completion date, 
effect: It’s too early to show slip ... If I 
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Ffre 2. My model’s prediction of the DE-A project’s cost and schedule compared with 
the project’s actuals. Curve 1 compares the schedule in days; curve 2 shows the per- 
ceived project size, measured in thousands of delivered source instructions; curve 3 
compares the project cost in man-days; curve 4 compares the work force; and curve 5 
shows the estimate of the percentage of the project that is complete. 
pressures developed that overrode con- 
siderations of work-force stability. Man- 
agement would pay any price to avoid 
overs h oo ting the Way-before-launc h 
deadline. This translated, as Figure 2 indi- 
cates, into a hiring binge late in the cycle. 
While there are other ways to compress 
a schedule, including buying faster hard- 
ware and automation software, these o p  
tions are more feasible on large projects, 
where the schedule spans several years 
and uses hundreds of programmers. They 
are less suited to small- and medium-sized 
projects like DE-A. Instead, managers in 
such projects compress the schedule by in- 
creasing the staff size or working the staff 
10nger.~ My experiments assume this to be 
the case. 
Compressionandcost 
In my first experiment, I wanted to de- 
rive the relationship between cost and 
schedule compression. To do this, I simu- 
lated the DE-A project with different time 
schedules, holding all other project pa- 
rameters (including project estimates for 
size and effort) constant at their base 
values. 
Figure 3 shows that schedule compres 
sion would lead to significantly higher 
costs on the DE-A project. But schedule 
stretch-out (beyond the base value) a p  
pears to have little effect. Overall, the 
trade-off between cost and schedule on 
this project conforms to the results shown 
in Figure 1 .  
Simulation experimentation can an- 
swer not only the what but the why. Figure 
4a plots several project variables for the 
base simulation and Figure 4b plots the 
same project variables when the project’s 
schedule was compressed by 25 percent 
(when the project began with a schedule 
equal to 0.75 times 320, or 240 days). 
When the schedule was compressed, 
management maintained a larger staff 
throughout the cycle. As Figure 2 shows, a 
larger team leads to higher communica- 
tion overhead. which dilutes the team’s 
Y 
x 2000 8 
0- 100 200 300 400 500 600 
Scheduled completion time (days) 
Figure 3. The costkchedule trade-off for 
the DE-A project using the base values. 
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Figure4 Four variables of the DE-Aproject plotted on (a) a normal schedule and (b) a 
schedule that has been compressed by 25 percent. The difference in the work-force pat- 
terns is striking. 
productivity and leads to higher project 
costs.2 
In addition, when new staff is hired to 
increase the staff size, the fraction of the 
work force with experience drops and, as 
a result, the cumulative training overhead 
increases. Although not all new members 
are necessarily recruited from outside the 
organization (some might be transferred 
from other projects), all employees new to 
the project require some orientation. Al- 
though it obviously costs less to orient a 
transferred employee than an outside re- 
cruit, project orientation is still a signifi- 
cant drag on productivity. The training 
overhead is the number of mandays ex- 
pended to train new members, which can 
be very costly because it is done by the 
most experienced employees. 
The cost/schedule trade-off relation- 
ships reported in the literature portray 
project cost as a function of planned com- 
pletion time. However, experience indi- 
cates that software projects rarely com- 
plete on schedule, whether or not that 
schedule has been compressed. While you 
can expect that a compressed schedule 
would lead to ashorter project duration, it 
certainly is no guarantee that the project 
will complete on time. 
For a project manager who hopes to use 
the cost/schedule trade-off relationship 
for project planning, a plot of cost as a 
function of actual, not scheduled, com- 
pletion times is more useful. Figure 5a 
shows this for the DE-A project; Figure 5b 
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Figure 5. Cost as a function of actual, not 
scheduled, completion times. (a) A com- 
parison of the scheduled and actual costs 
for the DE-A project; (b) a comparison of 
the actual and scheduled completion 
times. 
compares planned and actual completion 
times. 
The fact that the curve in Figure 5b is 
always above the 45degree line indicates 
that the DE-A project persistently over- 
shot its scheduled completion time over 
the entire range of schedule compression 
and stretch+ut values tested. The curve is 
almost parallel to the 45degree line ex- 
cept near the origin, where the project a p  
proaches the limits of schedule compres 
sion of about 250 days. 
The culprit behind the persistant sched- 
ule  overshoot is the 35-percent un- 
derestimation error in project size: the 
difference between its estimated size 
(16,000 lines) and its true size (24,400 
lines). Because undersizing can signifi- 
cantly affect project-completion time, it 
must also affect the trade-off between cost 
and schedule. 
This in turn means my results are sus- 
pect because they portray not the true 
cost/schedule trade-off but the trade-off 
of an undersized DE-A project. In light of 
the pervasive undersizing in the software 
industry, I suspect that this experimenta- 
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tion flaw permeates the cost/schedule 
studies reported in the literature. 
Umlersizing and cost 
According to Barry Boehm, un- 
dersizing “is our most critical roadblock to 
accurate software e~timation.”~ A major 
cause for undersizing is “. . . [the] powerful 
tendency to focus on the highly visible 
mainline components of the software and 
to underestimate or completely miss the 
unobtrusive components ([for example,] 
help message processing, error process- 
ing, and moving data around) .”3 
Scheduleestimation models are gar- 
bage-in, garbage-out devices: If we put 
poor sizing data in, poor schedule esti- 
mates come out. On the DE-A project, a 
35-percent underestimation of project 
size led to an underestimate of manday 
and time requirements, which in turn in- 
advertently compressed the schedule. As 
the project progressed and knowledge of 
what the software was intended to do in- 
creased, the missed tasks were progres 
sively discovered, as reflected by DE-A’s 
perceivedjobsize curve in Figure 2. 
New project tasks gradually discovered 
on a project may or may not trigger an 
adjustment to manday and schedule esti- 
mates. Only when the discovered tasks are 
large enough do project members bother 
to formally update the cost estimates. The 
determining factor is not the absolute size 
of the discovered tasks but their size rela- 
tive to the perceived amount of remaining 
effort. 
For example, a 100-manday task discov- 
ered at the beginning of a 100,00@man- 
day project might not trigger any adjust- 
ments in the project’s estimates. But it’s 
likely it would if it were discovered at the 
end of the development phase, when only 
50 mandays remained. 
A combination of programmer opti- 
mism and the imperfect accuracy in mea- 
suring progress early in the life cycle 
masks the shortage in mandays that result 
from these practices.26 The classic result is 
the Wpercent syndrome, where the esti- 
mate of the fraction of work completed 
increases as planned until it reaches a 
level of 80 to 90 percent. It then increases 
very slowly until the project is completed. 
This is illustrated by the estimated per- 
centage complete curve in Figure 2. 
To isolate the effect of undersizing, I 
conducted simulation runs in which the 
project’s estimates for size and mandays 
were correctly estimated to be 24,400 lines 
and 2,200 mandays. Figure 6a shows the 
relationship between actual completion 
time and project cost in this scenario. It 
also plots the results of the first experi- 
ment, where size was underestimated. Fig- 
ure 6b compares the planned versus ac- 
tual completion times for the two 
experiments. 
In the absence of undersizing, the 
schedule overshoot all but disappeared, 
except near the origin where the project 
approached its compression limit of 
about 250 days. Also, the cost penalty for 
schedule compression was significantly 
lower than in the first experiment. 
To understand why the two experi- 
ments’ results are so different, compare 
the simulation run in Figure 7, which 
shows no undersizing but does compress 
the estimated schedule to 240 days, and 
Figure 4b, which shows the effects of both 
underestimation and schedule compres 
sion. 
The difference between the work-force 
.- 
E 
(a) Actual completion time (days) 
100 200 300 400 500 600 
100 200 300 400 500 600 
(b) Scheduled completion time (days) 
Experiment 1 
0 Experiment 2 
Figure 6. (a) Project cost versus actual 
completion times. The left curve repre- 
sents a scenario where the project has 
been accurately sized; the right curve is 
when the project has been undersized. (b) 
Actual completion times versus scheduled 
completion times. The left curve repre- 
sents undersized project; the right curve 
represents an accurately sized project. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Fire 7. The DE-A project simulated with a 25-percent schedule compression but no 
undersizing. 
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Systemdynamics model 
My work on schedule compression is part of a larger project to study 
the dynamics of the entire softwaredevelopment process. A major part 
of this effort is the development of a comprehensive systemdynamics 
model of software development. 
I based my model on a field study of project managers in five organi- 
zations (NASA, the subject of the simulations described in this artide, 
was not among the five). First, I interviewed managers in three organiza- 
tions to get an account of how projects are really managed. This informa- 
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Rmre A. An overview of the system-dynamics model's structure. 
patterns is striking. When it correctly esti- 
mates a project's size, management can 
plan for a stable work force and attain the 
shorter completion time. While the work- 
force level in Figure 4b was significantly 
lower throughout most of the cycle, it in- 
creased dramatically toward the end of 
the development phase, when manage- 
ment realized that many more tasks re- 
mained with precious little time to do 
them. In response, they reacted (or over- 
reacted) by adding more people late in 
the project, which is not costeffective. 
I drew three conclusions from these re- 
tion, complemented by my experience, yielded a skeleton system-dy- 
namics model. 
Next, I reviewed the literature, using my skeleton model as a road 
map. This filled many of the holes in the first model design and produced 
a second, much more detailed version of the model. 
Finally, in a series of intensive interviews with managers at three 
organizations (only one of which was in the first group of three), the 
model was exposed to critiasm, revised, exposed again, and so on, in 
an iterative process that continued until the model stabilized. 
Figure A shows a high-level view of the model's four subsystems: 
human-resource management, software production, control, and plan- 
ning, and some of the relations between them. The actual model is very 
detailed and contains more than 100 causal links; I have published afull 
description of the model's structure, its mathematical formulation, and its 
validation elsewhere.',2 
Human-resource management. This subsystem captures the hir- 
ing, training, assimilation, and transfer of people. I segregate the 
project's work force into employee types (newly hired and experienced, 
for example). I make this distinction because new team members are 
usually less productive than veterans. 
This segregation also lets me capture the training process to assimilate 
new members. The veterans usually train the newcomers, both technic- 
ally and sodally. This is important, because this training can significantly 
affect a project's progress by reducing the veterans' productivity. 
In deciding how big aworkforce they need, project managerstypically 
consider several factors. One, of course, is the project's scheduledcom- 
pletion date. Another is the work force's stability, so managers try to 
predict project employment time for new members before they are hired. 
In general, the relative weight managers give to stability versus comple- 
tion date changes as the project progresses. 
Software production. This subsystem models development; it does 
not indude the operation and maintenance phases. The development 
phases induded are designing, coding, and testing, but not the initial 
requirementsdefinition phase. 
I chose not to indude requirements definition for two reasons. First, 
my focus is on the indigenous development organization: project man- 
agers and developers. I wanted to see how their policies, decisions, and 
actions affect development. In many organizations, detinin user re- 
quirements is not completely within the control of this group. Second, 
"analysis to determine requirements is distinguished as an activity apart 
from software development. Technically, the product of analysis is non- 
procedural ([that is], the focus is functional)," C.L. McGowen and R.C. 
McHenry have written? 
The software-production subsystem models productivity and its de- 
B 
sults: 
In the absence of undersizing, the 
cost/schedule trade-off is much flatter. 
The significantly higher cost penalty 
associated with undersizing can he attrib 
uted to staffing inefficiencies that arise as 
management (0ver)reacts late in the life 
cycle to the unforeseen increase in the 
project's size. 
The cost/schedule trade-off results re- 
ported in the literature are suspect be- 
cause most are based on quantitative mod- 
els calibrated with historical project data. 
Because undersizing is pervasive in soft- 
ware projects, I expect that many of these 
historical projects sustained inflated costs 
that reflected the combined influences of 
schedule compression and undersizing. 
Management 
commitment 
Project scheduling is continuous, with 
estimates made and revised throughout a 
project's life. A project's final completion 
time thus depends not only on how much 
its schedule is compressed or stretched 
but also on management's commitment 
to maintaining the original schedule. 
1 02 IEEE Software 
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terminants in great detail. Productivity is defined as potential prcductivity 
minus the loss from faulty processes. Potential productivity is ”the maxi- 
mum level of productivity that can occur when an individual or 
group.. .makes the best possible use of its resources,” according to I.D. 
Steit~er.~ and is a function of the nature of the task and the group’s 
resources. Loss from faulty processes are losses in productivity from 
things like communication and coordination overhead and low motiva- 
tion. 
Control subsystem. In all organizations, decisions are based on the 
information available to the decision maker. Often, this information is 
inaccurate.Apparentconditions may be far removedfrom those actually 
encountered, depending on information flow, time lag, and distortion. 
Thus, those who study system dynamics go to great lengths to distin- 
guish between actual and perceived model variables. 
Progress rate is a good example of a variable that is difficult to assess 
during the project. Because software is basically an intangible product 
during most of the development, it is difficult to measure things like 
programming performance and intermediate work. 
How can you measure progress? My own feu studies corroborated 
published reports, in which progress, especially in the earlier phases of 
development, is typically measured by the rate of resource expenditure 
rather than accomplishments. In other words, when asked to estimate 
how much of the program is complete, a programmer will divide how 
remaining remaining f \Indicated work/ 
force level Maximum tolerable 1 completion date 
\ I  
Willingness to 
level y d e d  c--- change work 
Current work __I_ Work force 
force level force 
/ I  
Hiring Assimilation \ _ _ _ _ I  level Work sought force delay delay 
Ceiling on total 
workforce 
Fi- B. Adjusting work force and schedule, as modeled in the plan- 
ning subsystem. 
much time he‘s spent on the project by the time budgeted, realizing that 
he is wrong only when he is almost finished or almost out of time. 
When you measure progress this way, status reports become nothing 
more than an echo of the original plan. But as the prow advances 
toward its final stages, work accomplishments become relatively more 
visible and project members better perceive how productive the work 
force has actually been. 
Planning subsystem. In the planning subsystem, you make project 
estimates, revising them as the project progresses. For example, when 
aprojectisbehinds&edule,youcan revisetheplantohiremorepeople, 
extend the schedule, or both. 
Figure B shows a detailed causal-loop structure of the adjlrstments to 
work force and schedule. By dividing the value of mandays remaining 
at any point in the project by the time remaining, a manager can deter- 
mine the indicated work-force level, which is the work force needed to 
complete the project on time. 
Hiring decisions are not made solely on the basis of scheduling re- 
quirements. Managers must also consider the training requirements 
and the work force’sstability. Thus, before adding new project members, 
management assesses the project employment time for the new mem- 
bers. 
In general, the relative weighting between the desire for work-force 
stability and the desire to complete the project on time is not static; it 
changes throughout the project’s life. 
My model takes into account these pressures with a weigM factor I call 
the willingness to change work force, described more fully in the main 
text. 
Although management determines the work-force level needed to 
complete the project, this level does not necessarily translate into the 
actual hiring goal (the work-force level sought in Figure B). The hiring 
goal is constrained by the ceiling on new hires. This ceiling represents 
the highest work force-level management believes can be adequately 
handled by its experienced project members. 
Thus, three factors-scheduled completion time, work-forcestabilii, 
and training requirements -affect the work-force level. 
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In my third experiment, I investigated 
how different levels of managerial com- 
mitment (or stubbornness) to the original 
schedule affects a project’s final cost and 
completion time. 
In my model, the regulator of the level 
of managerial commitment to schedule is 
measured by a weight factor I call the 
willingness to change work force. The 
WCWF captures management’s prefer- 
ences in handling schedule slippages - 
whether it be to add staff, extend the 
schedule, or both. Such preferences are 
not static; they change throughout the 
life cycle. 
For example, toward the end of the 
project, managers are considerably more 
reluctant to bring in new people even if 
the project is behind schedule. It would 
take too much time and effort - relative 
to the time and effort remaining - to ac- 
quaint new people with the project’s me- 
chanics, integrate them into the project 
team, and train them. 
Adding staff. Our model captures these 
managerial considerations in the follow- 
ing formula: 
work-force level needed 
= (indicated work-force level) *(WCWF) 
+ (current work-force level)*( 1-WCWF) 
WCWF, which assumes avalue from 0 to 1 
inclusive, itself comprises two compe  
nents: WCWFl and WCWF2. WCWFl cap 
tures the pressures for work-force stability 
that develop as the project proceeds to its 
final stages; WCWF2 captures the o p p e  
site pressure to meet the schedule at any 
Figure 8a depicts a WCWFl policy 
curve. In this case, I assume that WCWF 
comprises only WCWFl and is therefore 
cost. 
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Figure 8. The willingness-to-change- 
work-force policy curves. (a) The WCWFl 
policy, when management is always 
willing to increase the work force to the 
level needed to get the job done. (b) The 
WCWF2 policy, when pressures to meet a 
maximum tolerable completion date over- 
ride concerns about work-force stability 
and training overhead. 
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Figrrm9.The effect of management hiring 
policies (a) on project cost in man-days 
and (b) on completion time. 
equal to WCWFl . In the early stages of the 
project, when the time remaining is gen- 
erally much larger than the time parame- 
ter (the sum of hiring and assimilation de- 
lays), WCWF is equal to l. 
Substituting 1 for WCFC in the equation 
means that the work-force level needed 
equals the indicated work-force level, 
which we determine by dividing the 
amount of effort remaining (in mandays) 
by the time remaining (in working days). 
In this scenario, management adjusts its 
work force to the level needed to finish on 
schedule. 
However, as the number ofworking days 
remaining drops below 1.5 times the time 
parameter, the value of WCWF drops 
below 1 in Figure Sa. A WCWF value be- 
tween 0 and l means that management 
will respond to schedule slippages partly 
by increasing the work force and partly by 
extending the schedule. 
Furthermore, when the time remaining 
drops below 0.3 times the time parameter, 
the policy curve in Figure 8a drops to 0, 
suggesting that no more additions will be 
made to the project's work force. Sub  
stituting 0 for WCWF in the equation 
means that management sets the work- 
force level needed to the value of the cur- 
rent work-force level. If the project falls 
behind schedule at that stage, manage- 
ment responds by adjusting the schedule- 
completion date. (Other options include 
trimming the project's deliverables.) 
Overriding pressures Because some of 
the organizations I studied were develop 
ing embedded software for weapon and 
space systems, serious schedule slippages 
were not tolerated because they translated 
into very costly delays in the system's deliv- 
ery schedule. To safeguard against mis- 
estimation, such projects incorporated a 
safety factor. 
For example, if the project's maximum 
tolerable completion date was 100 days, 
using a2@percent safety factor meant that 
the project would be scheduled to com- 
plete in 80 days. If the project encoun- 
tered schedule difficulties, management's 
reaction would depend on how close the 
project was to overshooting its maximum 
tolerable completion date. As long as the 
scheduled completion date was comfort- 
ably below the maximum tolerable com- 
pletion date, management would base de- 
cisions on adjusting the schedule, adding 
more people, or both on balancing sched- 
uling and work-force stability considera- 
tions as captured by WCWFl. 
But if the scheduled completion date 
approached the maximum tolerable com- 
pletion date, pressures would develop 
that would make managers increasingly 
willing to override the work-force stability 
considerations and add people late into 
the project. The following formula for 
WCWF captures these overriding pres- 
sures: 
WCWF = maximum (WC'wFl, WCWFZ) 
Figure 8b depicts the WCWF2 policy 
curve. As long as the scheduled comple- 
tion date is comfortably below the maxi- 
mum tolerable completion date, the value 
ofWCWF2is0,whichmeansitwould have 
no bearing on determining WCWF and, 
consequently, on hiring decisions. 
But when the scheduled completion 
date approaches the maximum tolerable 
completion date, the value of WCWM 
rises. Because this typically happens 
toward the end of the project, it occurs 
when thevalueofWCWF1 isclose toOand 
is decreasing. As W C W  exceeds the 
value of WCWF1, WCWF becomes com- 
pletely dominated by the desire not to 
overshoot the maximum tolerable com- 
pletion date. 
WCWF is an expression of a project- 
management policy. Although the curves 
in Figure 8 characterize the staffing policy 
on the DE-A project, you can derive the 
shapes of the WCWF policy curves for any 
project by interviewing project managers 
and reviewing project records. 
Two policies. In my third experiment, I 
investigated two extreme policies. In the 
first case, I made WCWFl equal to 1 
throughout the cycle. The formula 
WCWF = maximum (1, WCWF2) 
= I  
indicates that management will alwys a& 
just the work force to the level it believes is 
necessary to keep the project on schedule. 
The second policy I investigated was to 
make WCWF2 equal to 0. The formula 
WCWF =maximum (WCWFI ,0) 
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eliminates the pressure of a maximum 
tolerable completion date. Thus, if the I 
project experiences schedule difficulties 
late in the life cycle (when WCWFl equals 
0) , management copes by adjusting the 
schedule completion date, not the work- 
force level. 
I tested both policies with DE-A's base 
estimates for size (16,000 lines) and 
man-days (1,100). Figure 9 shows the 
cost/schedule trade-off relationship. 
The results indicate that management's 
preferences for maintaining the stabil- 
ity of the work force (policy 2) or the 
schedule (policy 1 )  have a significant ef- 
fect on the cost/schedule trade-off rela- 
tionship. 
I conclude that for any softwaredevel- 
opment environment, not one but a r e p  
ertoire of cost/schedule trade-offs exist to 
suit managerial policy as it pertains to the 
maintenance of work-force and schedule 
levels. 
For the student of schedule compres- 
sion, my experiment shows that this pol- 
icy issue is a critical variable that must be 
inco rpora t ed  in the  study of t he  
cost/schedule trade-off in software de- 
velopment. 
revious studies have treated sched- 
ule compression as a static deci- P sion made at project initiation and 
as one that can be unambiguously mea- 
sured. My results indicate that neither is 
true. 
What management perceives as the cost 
of compression can be very different from 
the actual amount of compression a proj- 
ect undergoes because of undersizing. 
Furthermore, project scheduling is a con- 
tinuous process, with original estimates 
revised throughout the project life. The 
final cost and completion time of aproject 
depend not only on  how much the 
project's schedule is initially compressed 
or stretched but on management's com- 
mitment to maintaining that original 
schedule as well. 
The system-dynamics model's inte- 
grated nature proved to be particularly 
valuable in my study. The model inte- 
grates lifecycle activities (design, coding, 
and testing, for example) and project- 
management activities and policies 
(management's commitment to the origi- 
January 1990 
nal schedule, for example). A major limi- 
tation in much of the research to date has 
been that it did not integrate our knowl- 
edge of the microcomponents of project 
management into a comprehensive sys 
tem. 
This study demonstrates that such a 
microcomponent-oriented approach is 
not enough. Before we can say that we 
have a complete understanding of the 
software-development process, we must 
synthesize our knowledge of the individ- 
ual piecesof the process into a total system 
that allows for the interaction of all rele- 
vant variables and all structural compe 
nents. 
Three research areas are particularly 
promising. First, this modeling technique 
could be extended to investigate not the 
dynamics of a single project but the devel- 
opment organization itself, as it develops 
a continuous stream of software, places it 
into operation, and maintains it. Second, I 
am investigating the usefulness of incor- 
porating AI-based modules into the 
model. The objective of one project is to 
build an "expert simulator" for quality as- 
surance. Third, many organizations (in- 
cluding the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 
Mitre, and AT&T Bell Laboratories) are 
extending and customizing this model to 
support project management. 0:. 
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